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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains an anti-
retaliation provision that protects employees when they oppose activity 
unlawful under the statute.  To be protected from retaliation, however, 
the employee’s opposition must be performed in a manner that Title 
VII protects.  The requirements for protected activity are that the 
employee must: 1) speak out or protest against an act, 2) that s/he has 
a reasonable, good-faith belief violates Title VII, 3) in a reasonable 
manner.   
A split of authority has emerged as a result of the courts 
addressing facts involving an employee’s rejection of a supervisor’s 
sexual advances.  The Fifth Circuit and a minority of district courts 
hold that the employee’s rejection, without more, is not enough to be 
protected from retaliation.  The Eighth Circuit and a majority of 
district courts, however, hold that rejection of sexual advances is by 
definition “opposition,” and should be a protected activity.   
This comment will argue that an employee who rejects a 
supervisor’s sexual advances should be granted the presumption that 
s/he has spoken out against the act and will offer a framework for 
courts to apply when confronted with the factual scenario at bar.  The 
framework involves granting the employee the presumption that s/he 
has properly protested, but having her/him show that s/he had a 
reasonable, good-faith belief that her supervisor’s advances violated 
Title VII.  If diligently applied, this approach will allow the courts to 
reasonably balance the interests and vulnerabilities of the employee 
and employer, while staying true to the purposes of Title VII.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Imagine a female employee working at your everyday 
company.  Like any employee with ambition, her goal is to do her job, 
and do it well.  She has worked hard through college to get to her 
current position, and she can visualize that with the right amount of 
determination, her future with the company is bright.  Months into her 
tenure, however, she begins to notice that her supervisor has been 
giving her attention that many would deem inappropriate.  It begins 
with comments that demonstrate an appreciation of her presence, such 
as statements involving her physical appearance and attire.  Then the 
comments escalate into sexual advances when the supervisor asks the 
employee to join him for dinner or to take their lunch break to a local 
motel room.  Inexperienced, third-person observation would provide 
that the employee has clear and simple options to remedy her situation.  
It is a valuable exercise, however, to consider what goes through the 
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female employee’s mind as her supervisor is waiting for a response to 
his sexual propositions.    
It is no secret that women have historically struggled to reach 
equality in the workplace, and, given this knowledge, women likely 
perceive that they face an uphill battle in terms of promotion and 
recognition.  It has been observed that women face “pervasive 
occupational segregation, underrepresentation in leadership positions, 
and inequities in compensation.”1  In 2008, it was measured that 
women earn approximately 75% of what men earn and that wage gap 
has “closed very little in three decades.”2  One year after their college 
graduation, full-time female workers earn only 80% of their male 
counterparts, and the gap widens to females earning only 69% of male 
earnings ten years after graduation, “even when occupation, hours, 
parent-hood, and other factors typically associated with earnings over 
time are statistically controlled.”3  Another study also revealed that 
when women are acknowledged to have been successful in a male 
gender-typed job, they are “less liked and more personally derogated 
than equivalently successful men” and that being disliked can have 
career-affecting outcomes in terms of evaluations and 
recommendations.4  
 Given the issues above, and others like “fear of job loss, 
especially if insecurely employed, fear of retribution or retaliation, 
reluctance to be viewed as a victim, self-doubt or the fear of being 
seen as ‘too sensitive’, the belief that the harasser will not receive any 
penalty, lack of knowledge of rights, and lack of accessibility of 
external supports . . . ,”5  it is easy to believe the estimation that only 
5-30% of sexual harassment victims file any complaints, with fewer 
than 1% subsequently participating in legal proceedings.6  Considering 
these factors, it may be easier said than done to take action through 
traditional means, such as filing a formal complaint with human 
resources or complaining to another supervisor.   
 Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer 
cannot discriminate against employees who have opposed any 
                                                 
 
1
 Ruth E. Fassinger, Workplace Diversity and Public Policy: Challenges and 
Opportunities for Psychology, 63 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 252, 253 (2008).   
2
 Id. at 253-54. 
3
 Id. at 254. 
4
 Madeline E. Heilman et al., Penalties for Success: Reactions to Women Who 
Succeed at Male Gender-Typed Tasks, 89 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 416 
(2004).   
5
 Paula McDonald, Workplace Sexual Harassment 30 Years on: A Review of the 
Literature, 14 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT REVIEWS 1, 9 (2011).   
6
 Id.  
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unlawful employment practice under the statute.7  This assertion under 
the opposition clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects 
employees from adverse employment actions when they oppose an 
unlawful act that violates the statute.  To prove retaliation on the basis 
of opposition activity, the employee has the burden of establishing a 
prima facie case by showing that the employee: (1) “engaged in 
protected activity that Title VII protects;” (2) was subjected to “an 
adverse employment action;” and (3) the protected activity is causally 
connected to the adverse employment action.8  The source of much 
litigation in Title VII retaliation cases arises from the issue of whether 
the employee engaged in a statutorily protected activity.  The courts 
have generally required that for an opposition act to be protected, the 
employee must: 1) speak out or protest against activity9 2) have a 
reasonable, good-faith belief that the activity is unlawful under Title 
VII,10 3) protest in a reasonable manner.11  A particular scenario that 
has caused confusion among the lower courts is whether an 
employee’s rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advances is a protected 
activity under the opposition clause.  The disagreement arises from the 
issue of what an employee is required to do when s/he engages in an 
act of opposition.  
 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and a minority of district 
courts subscribe to the belief that an employee’s rejection of sexual 
advances, without more, is not enough to be statutorily protected 
activity under Title VII.12  The Eighth Circuit and a majority of district 
courts, however, subscribe to the belief that an employee’s rejection of 
sexual advances is by definition, “opposing” unlawful activity, and is 
therefore, protected activity under Title VII.13   
 This comment will provide a layered argument in proposing a 
reasonable approach to retaliation claims involving an employee’s 
rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advances.  Part I of the comment will 
provide an overview of the Title VII retaliation landscape, 
summarizing the relevant statutory language, the employee’s burden in 
retaliation cases, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on retaliation 
claims grounded in the opposition clause, and the split of authority 
                                                 
 
7
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006); Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 269 
(2001).    
8
 Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 439 (5th Cir. 2005).   
9
 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 278 
(2009). 
10
 See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271.   
11
 Rollins v. Fla. Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1989).   
12
 See LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp., 480 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2007).   
13
 See Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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among the lower courts in terms of the rejection of sexual advances.  
Part II of the comment, the argument section, will proceed in layers.  
The first subsection will argue that the current federal case law on 
opposition activity reveals that the rejection of sexual advances should 
be considered protected activity under the opposition clause.  The 
second subsection will argue that, even if a court does not agree with 
the contention that the current federal case law protects the rejection of 
sexual advances, such a unique circumstance demands different 
treatment from the more traditional forms of opposition activity.  The 
third subsection will propose a reasonable framework for the courts to 
apply when addressing a retaliation claim involving the rejection of 
sexual advances.  This framework includes granting the employee the 
presumption that she has spoken out against discrimination if she 
rejected a sexual advance, which is harnessed by the inquiry of 
whether the employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the 
supervisor violated Title VII by creating a hostile work environment.  
The fourth subsection will raise various policy considerations 
involving the protection of the rejection of sexual advances and the 
application of the suggested framework.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. Anti-Retaliation Provision under Title VII 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.14  Within the overarching prohibition against discrimination, 
Section 704(a) of Title VII also protects employees from retaliation 
should they oppose discrimination or participate in Title VII processes, 
the relevant language stating: “It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees 
or applicants for employment, for an employment agency . . . to 
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to 
discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, 
because he has opposed any practice, made an unlawful employment 
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, 
or hearing under this subchapter.”15  This retaliation provision of Title 
VII is separated into the opposition clause and the participation clause, 
with the former protecting a wider range of employee conduct than the 
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 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
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 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).   
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latter.16  The participation clause protects employees from retaliation 
only when s/he has participated in the Title VII machinery, meaning 
that the employee participated in an investigation, proceeding, hearing, 
or litigation under Title VII.17  The opposition clause, however, serves 
as a catchall for many activities that are not covered under the 
participation clause, in that the employee will be protected from 
retaliation if s/he opposes unlawful conduct in a proper manner, even 
though the Title VII machinery has not been initiated.18  An example 
of opposition activity that is generally accepted by the courts is when 
an employee complains to her human resources department about a 
supervisor who is sexually harassing her.  The rejection of sexual 
advances, which is the subject of this comment, does not fall under the 
participation clause.  So accordingly, we will proceed solely within the 
bounds of the opposition clause.   
 In a retaliation case where the employee is invoking protection 
under the opposition clause, the court will apply the traditional three-
step McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis.19  First, the 
employee must establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the 
opposition clause, where s/he must show that s/he engaged in an 
activity that Title VII protects, s/he was subjected to an adverse 
employment action, and the adverse employment action is causally 
connected with the employee’s protected activity.20  If the employee is 
able to establish a prima facie case, the employer will then have the 
burden to produce evidence showing a legitimate non-retaliatory 
reason for the adverse employment action.21  If the employer is able to 
produce evidence showing such a reason, the employee will have the 
opportunity to prove that that the employer’s stated reason was 
pretextual.22   
 This comment focuses on the first element of the employee’s 
prima facie case in an opposition clause retaliation claim, the 
requirement being that the employee must show that s/he engaged in 
an opposition act that Title VII protects.  Courts have established 
guidelines to determine whether an employee’s opposition should be 
                                                 
 
16
 See Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir. 
2006) (stating that “[p]rotected conduct . . . also [includes] complaining to one’s 
supervisors”).   
17
 See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Serv., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 
1174 (11th Cir. 2000).  
18
 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 15-12 
(Barbara T. Lindemann et al. eds., 5th ed. 2012).    
19
 Lemaire, 480 F.3d at 388-89.   
20
 Id. at 388.  
21
 Id. 
22
 Id.  
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“protected activity” under Title VII.  The guidelines are that the 
employee must 1) speak out or protest against activity that, 2) s/he has 
a reasonable, good-faith belief is unlawful under Title VII, 3) in a 
reasonable manner.23  Although on the surface, the framework for 
seeking protection from retaliation seems relatively clear, many issues 
persist as to what should be considered “protected activity” when 
confronted with the complexities of the modern-day workplace.  The 
Supreme Court of the United States has only addressed the contours of 
“protected activity” against retaliation on a few occasions, and has not 
directly addressed whether certain forms of opposition, like the 
rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advances, should be considered 
protected under the opposition clause.24   
 
B. The Supreme Court and Protected Activity under the 
Opposition Clause 
 
 In 2001, the Supreme Court addressed the reasonable, good-
faith belief requirement for protected activity in Clark County School 
District v. Breeden.25  There, a supervisor made a single sexually 
explicit remark in the presence of the plaintiff-employee, saying “I 
hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon.”26  
The employee later complained about the comment to several people, 
including the offending employee’s supervisor and the Assistant 
Superintendent, and alleged that she was later punished for her 
complaints.27  Since sexual harassment was what the employee was 
opposing, the Supreme Court stated the relevant legal standard that 
establishes a hostile work environment and concluded “no reasonable 
person could have believed that the single incident recounted above 
violated Title VII’s standard [for sexual harassment].”28  
 In 2009, the Supreme Court addressed the opposition clause in 
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville.29  There, the 
employer’s human resources department began looking into rumors of 
sexual harassment by the employee relations director, Gene Hughes.30  
As part of the investigation, the human resources director called in the 
                                                 
 
23
 See LINDEMANN, supra note 18, at 15-13 to 15-24.   
24
 Diana M. Watral, Note, When “No” is Not Enough: The Express Rejection of 
Sexual Advances Under Title VII, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 527 (2010). 
25
 Breeden, 532 U.S. at 268.   
26
 Id. at 269.   
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. at 271. 
29
 See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 271. 
30
 Id. at 274. 
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plaintiff-employee to ask if she had witnessed any inappropriate 
behavior on the part of Hughes, to which she provided several 
instances of sexual harassment committed by Hughes.31  After the 
investigation, Crawford and the two other employees who accused 
Hughes of sexual harassment were terminated, the official reason 
being for embezzlement.32  The issue before the Court was whether the 
plaintiff-employee engaged in protected activity even though her 
opposition was not on her own initiative.33  The Court held even 
though she gave her account of Hughes’s sexually harassing behavior 
after she had been summoned by the human resources director, the 
plaintiff-employee still engaged in protected activity under the 
opposition clause.34  The Court elaborated, “nothing in [Title VII] 
requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports 
discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same 
discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.”35   
 Ultimately, Breeden and Crawford provide two narrow 
clarifications of protected activity covered under the opposition clause.  
According to Breeden, the courts should inquire as to whether the 
employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the act s/he opposed 
is unlawful under Title VII.36  To determine if such a reasonable, 
good-faith belief existed, a court should, like the Supreme Court in 
Breeden, refer to the standard of the discriminatory act that the 
employee opposed, and decide whether the offending supervisor’s act 
created a reasonable, good-faith belief that the standard was violated.37  
According to Crawford, the courts should not limit protected activity 
under the opposition clause to protests that are initiated by the 
complaining employee.  The Court made clear that protection under 
the opposition clause may cover untraditional situations where the 
employee is not the party that instigates or initiates a complaint.38  
Given the limited nature of these rulings, however, the lower courts 
have struggled when addressing such untraditional forms of 
opposition.  An employee’s rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advances 
is no exception, with the situation being illustrated by an employee 
simply replying with a “No.” to a supervisor’s sexual advance.  The 
lower federal courts have understandably split over the issue as to 
                                                 
 
31
 Id.   
32
 Id.   
33
 Id. at 276-77. 
34
 Id. at 277. 
35
 Id. at 277-78. 
36
 See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271. 
37
 Id. at 270-71. 
38
 See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277-78. 
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whether the employee’s rejection is enough to be protected activity 
under the opposition clause.  The subsection that follows illustrates the 
split of authority.  
 
C. Circuit Split over the Rejection of Sexual Advances 
 
 The circuit split regarding the protected status of rejections of 
sexual advances is illustrated through decisions of the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuit Courts of Appeal.  The Fifth Circuit subscribes to the belief 
that such rejections are not protected activity while the Eighth Circuit 
believes that the rejections should be protected under the opposition 
clause. 
In LeMaire v. Louisiana Department of Transportation, the 
Fifth Circuit held that an employee’s rejection of his supervisor’s 
sexual advances was not protected activity under the opposition 
clause.39  There, the employee claimed that on two separate occasions 
his supervisor subjected him to sexually explicit stories that included 
past acts of molestation, his sex life with his wife, and his homosexual 
inclinations.40  The employee asked his supervisor to stop talking 
about such topics, but the supervisor refused and continued the 
conversation.41  The supervisor later ordered the employee to spray 
herbicide on a large area of a lawn, which the employee believed was 
outside of his job description, and, therefore, believed was retaliation 
for asking the supervisor to stop telling the sexually explicit stories.42  
The employee later left the job site and reported the incident to the 
Bridge Operator Foreman.43  The employee was then suspended 
without pay by the District Maintenance Engineer for refusing to spray 
the herbicide as ordered by the supervisor and for leaving the work site 
without authorization.44  In holding that the rejection of the 
supervisor’s sexual advances was not protected activity, the Fifth 
Circuit simply asserted that the employee “provide[d] no authority for 
the proposition that rejecting sexual advances constitutes a protected 
activity for purposes of a retaliation claim under Title VII.”45   
In Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held that the 
employee’s rejection of sexual advances was protected activity under 
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 Lemaire, 480 F.3d at 389.   
40
 Id. at 385. 
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the opposition clause.46  There, the employee, Kerry Ogden, was 
subjected to multiple sexual advances by her supervisor, including 
numerous physical advances and sexual propositions.47  As a result of 
her rebuffs, the supervisor berated Ogden over work matters and also 
refused to complete her evaluation, thereby preventing the effectuation 
of her annual raise.48  The Eighth Circuit agreed with Ogden, holding 
that she engaged in “the most basic form of protected activity” when 
she rebuffed her supervisor’s sexual advances, and further asserted in a 
general manner that “[e]mployers may not retaliate against employees 
who ‘oppose discriminatory conduct . . . .”49   
 
D. Federal District Court Treatment of Rejection of Sexual 
Advances 
 
 Currently, the vast majority of district courts align with the 
Eighth Circuit in holding that the rejection of sexual advances is 
protected activity under the opposition clause.  An example of the 
lower courts’ treatment of the issue is illustrated in Burrell v. City 
University of New York, a 1995 decision from the Southern District of 
New York.50  The employee, Cherie Burrell, was employed as an 
assistant to the Dean of CUNY Medical School/Sophie Davis School 
of Biomedical Education (the “Dean”).51  The Dean served as Burrell’s 
supervisor, and throughout Burrell’s employment, he made numerous 
sexual advances towards her, all of which were rebuffed.52  The 
advances began as comments and actions that revealed a sexual 
interest in Burrell, but later turned into advances that included 
invitations to dinner and even propositions to engage in sex over the 
telephone.53  Burrell later complained to the school system’s 
Affirmative Action Office, and she was subsequently transferred to 
another department and ultimately terminated for her immigration 
status.54  The Southern District of New York held that “Burrell has 
presented evidence which would support an inference that she was 
terminated in retaliation either for making her initial complaint to 
                                                 
 
46
 See Ogden, 214 F.3d at 999.   
47
 Id. at 1003-04.   
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. at 1007.   
50
 Burrell v. City Univ. of N.Y., 894 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).   
51
 Id. at 753.   
52
 Id. at 754-55.   
53
 Id. at 755. 
54
 Id. at 756. 
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CUNY’s Affirmative Action Office or for refusing to accede to the 
Dean’s sexual advances.”55   
  A minority of district courts, however, does agree with the 
Fifth Circuit and holds that the rejection of sexual advances is not 
protected activity under the opposition clause.  An example of such 
alignment is Bowers v. Radiological Society of North American, Inc., a 
1999 case from the Northern District of Illinois.56  There, the 
employee, Beverly Bowers, was subjected to sexual advances by her 
supervisor, with whom she lived in the same townhouse.57  After 
rejecting the advances, she moved out of the townhouse and a month 
later, the supervisor gave what Bowers believed to be an unfair 
negative performance review.58  Bowers was later replaced by another 
employee and ultimately discharged on the ground that her position 
was being eliminated.59  The court asserted that “[o]pposition clearly 
includes filing a charge with the EEOC, bringing a lawsuit in court, or 
submitting a complaint to management . . . [and that] [i]nformal 
methods can also constitute protected activity.”60  The court held, 
however, that Bowers “has not alleged that she engaged in any form of 
opposition . . . [, but,] [i]nstead, she [only] alleges that she refused Ms. 
Davis’ advances and that she did not participate in the conduct.”61   
 In assessing the split of authority, it becomes clear that the 
disagreement arises from what the courts require of employees during 
the act of opposition.  The courts aligning with the Fifth Circuit 
subscribe to a strict approach where the employees may be required to 
do more than merely reject a supervisor’s sexual advances.  Compared 
to the traditional methods of opposition such as complaining to the 
human resources department, this side of the split believes that a mere 
rejection, without more, seems too ambiguous of a protest to invoke 
protection under Title VII, likely because the employee has not spoken 
out against the discriminatory act.  The courts aligning with the Eighth 
Circuit, however, subscribe to a more relaxed approach, in that a 
rejection of sexual advances is by definition “opposition” of unlawful 
activity.  Regardless of the side of the split, however, many of the 
courts have not engaged in thorough analyses as to why they do or do 
not find the rejection of sexual advances protected under Title VII.  
The present issue requires a more involved and detailed discussion 
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 Id. at 761.   
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 Bowers v. Radiological Soc’y of N. Am., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 594 (N.D. Ill. 1999).   
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 Id. at 597. 
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 Id.   
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 Id. at 599. 
61
 Id.   
48     Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice     [Vol. 2:2 
 
 
compared to what the courts have engaged in past opinions, especially 
in light of the ambiguous nature of the rejection of sexual advances 
and the complicated nature of the workplace. 
II. ARGUMENT: REJECTING A SUPERVISOR’S SEXUAL ADVANCES IS 
“SPEAKING OUT” AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, BUT COURTS MUST 
ASSESS THE EMPLOYEE’S REASONABLE, GOOD FAITH BELIEF TO 
DETERMINE PROTECTED ACTIVITY 
 
 This comment will argue that when an employee responds, 
“No.” to a supervisor’s sexual advances, the rejection is sufficient to 
satisfy the “speaking out” requirement for protected activity under the 
opposition clause.  This comment will make this argument by first 
establishing similarities and then by establishing differences.  The first 
subsection will maintain that finding rejection of sexual advances to be 
protected activity is consistent with federal case law.  The second 
subsection will argue that if one finds the first subsection 
unconvincing, then realizing what makes the rejection of sexual 
advances unique should persuade courts to distinguish this scenario 
from other, more traditional forms of opposition activity.  The third 
subsection will argue that if a court should agree with the arguments of 
either the first or the second subsection, that court should assess 
whether the employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the 
supervisor violated Title VII.  Finally, the fourth subsection will 
consider the policy implications surrounding the issue at bar.   
 
A. Drawing Comparisons: Current Federal Case Law on 
Protected Activity Under the Opposition Clause of Title VII. 
 
Although there is a split of authority on the precise issue of 
whether the rejection of sexual advances constitutes “speaking out” 
against discrimination, the federal courts have established a landscape 
that indicates that such activity is indeed “speaking out.”  As addressed 
in the introduction section above, the Supreme Court addressed the 
scope of the opposition clause for the first time in Crawford.62  In the 
opinion, Justice Souter revealed insight as to how the Court would 
likely rule on facts involving the rejection of sexual advances.  In 
ruling that the plaintiff engaged in opposition activity, Justice Souter 
maintained that the Court adopted a broad interpretation of opposition, 
and the term could be used “to speak of someone who has taken no 
action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it.”63  He went 
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 See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 271. 
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 Id. at 277. 
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further and asserted that it would be opposition activity “if an 
employee took a stand against an employer’s discriminatory practices 
not by ‘instigating’ action, but by standing pat, say, by refusing to 
follow a supervisor’s order to fire a junior worker for discriminatory 
reasons.”64  Although this statement was made in dictum, it is arguable 
that the rejection of sexual advances is less ambiguous of an 
opposition than Justice Souter’s opposition hypothetical in Crawford.  
Justice Souter’s employee, who defies his supervisor’s discriminatory 
intent  by refusing to fire a subordinate, could be defying the 
supervisor for one of many reasons.65  The subordinate may be a close 
friend of the employee, the employee may think that the subordinate is 
too valuable to terminate, or any other reason that does not serve as 
opposing a violation of Title VII.  Ultimately, Justice Souter gives the 
employee the benefit of the doubt and would assume that the employee 
is opposing the Title VII violation, even though it is ambiguous as to 
what the employee is actually opposing.  In terms of an employee who 
rejects a sexual advance, among the variety of reasons s/he could be 
doing so is that s/he opposes behavior that violates Title VII.  So why 
should s/he not receive the similar benefit of the doubt received by the 
hypothetical employee in Crawford?  
 It is also helpful to refer to the Supreme Court’s labor law 
jurisprudence, as the Court has previously looked to its labor law 
decisions for guidance in determining a Title VII issue.66  In the 1984 
case National Labor Relations Board v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 
the employer had a collective bargaining agreement with Local 247 of 
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen, and Helpers of America where the provision read:  
 
[t]he Employer shall not require employees to take out 
on the streets or highways any vehicle that is not in safe 
operating condition or equipped with safety appliances 
prescribed by law.  It shall not be a violation of the 
Agreement where employees refuse to operate such 
equipment unless such refusal is unjustified.67   
 
                                                 
 
64
 Id.  
65
 Id.  
66
 See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 142 (2004) (stating that 
constructive discharge has been recognized in the labor law context).   
67
 National Labor Relations Board v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 824-25 
(1984).  
50     Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice     [Vol. 2:2 
 
 
The employer asked the plaintiff-employee to drive a truck that needed 
to have repairs performed on the brakes.68  The employee refused, but 
he refused in a general manner without referring to his rights pursuant 
to the collective bargaining agreement or the National Labor Relations 
Act (the “NLRA”).69  The employee was subsequently discharged, and 
he later filed an unfair labor practice charge.70  The Supreme Court 
held that the employee had engaged in protected, concerted activity, 
which prevents the employer from discharging him on the grounds of 
his protected behavior under the NLRA.71  The Court maintained that 
even though the employee did not mention he was asserting his rights 
under the collective bargaining agreement or the NLRA,  
 
[a]s long as the employee’s statement or action is based 
on a reasonable and honest belief that he is being, or 
has been, asked to perform a task that he is not required 
to perform under his collective-bargaining agreement, 
and the statement or action is reasonably directed 
toward the enforcement of a collectively bargained 
right . . . 
 
the employee has engaged in protected, concerted activity.72   
 The factual scenario in the City Disposal decision is analogous 
to an employee’s rejection of sexual advances in the Title VII context.  
The employer in City Disposal ordered the employee to drive a 
defective truck, which was a violation of the collective bargaining 
agreement, and the employee simply refused without asserting any 
rights other than his own safety.73  The employee who rejects a sexual 
advance performs an analogous act by giving a general, negative 
response to a request by her supervisor that we assume violated Title 
VII by creating a hostile work environment.  If the refusal in City 
Disposal sufficed to be protected and concerted in the labor law 
context, the analogous refusal of a sexual advance should be enough to 
be considered “speaking out” in the Title VII context.   
The lower federal courts have also deemed scenarios similar to 
the rejection of sexual advances protected under the opposition clause.  
The scenario most comparable to sexual advance rejections would be 
an employee’s refusal to participate in a supervisor’s discriminatory 
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practice, which generally occurs not by the employee orally objecting 
to a discriminatory practice, but by the employee merely failing to 
engage in the discriminatory activity.  An example of such a scenario 
is illustrated in EEOC v. St. Anne’s Hospital of Chicago, where the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employee’s refusal to 
participate in the employer’s discriminatory activity was a protected 
activity.74  There, the employee was in charge of the security 
department of the hospital, and in 1978, she hired a black man to fill a 
vacant position in her department.75  The hiring was met with violent 
public opposition, as the hospital began receiving bomb threats from 
one or more persons claiming membership in the American Nazi 
Party, with several fires also starting unexpectedly.76  The employee 
was subsequently discharged because she “was an irritant to the person 
or persons making the calls and/or setting the fires.”77  Like an 
employee who rejects a sexual advance, the employee in St. Anne’s 
Hospital did not make it clear that she was opposing an unlawful 
activity under Title VII when she made the hire.78  Indeed, the Seventh 
Circuit interpreted the facts to show that the employee hired the black 
applicant without any contrary directions from the employer.79  With 
no discriminatory act from the employer prior to the employee’s hiring 
of the black applicant, the employee had nothing to oppose when she 
hired him, and yet, the Seventh Circuit still deemed the employee’s 
action as protected opposition.   
 Similarly, in Taylor v. Scottpolar Corp., the Federal District 
Court of Arizona held that an employee’s refusal to participate in 
discriminating against a pregnant subordinate constituted protected 
activity.80  There, the plaintiff was a district manager of Scottpolar, 
and he alleged that his supervisor sought to terminate a foreman 
because of her pregnancy by “fish[ing] for damning information 
against her.”81  Although the plaintiff “did not openly disagree with 
[his supervisor] . . . he refused to participate.”82  Drawing a 
comparison to rejection of sexual advances, it was not clear whether 
the plaintiff in Taylor refused to participate because he opposed 
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discrimination that violated Title VII, or for some other reason not 
related to the discriminatory act.  In the face of this ambiguity, the 
court still asserted that if the plaintiff could prove he refused to 
participate, his actions would be protected under the opposition 
clause.83   
By assessing the current landscape of opposition activity under 
Title VII, it becomes clear that the rejection of sexual advances should 
constitute “speaking out” against discrimination.  When courts decide 
cases involving Title VII retaliation, the opinions have had a tendency 
to neglect addressing why a certain act is protected opposition activity.  
What is clear is that in cases of an ambiguous protest, such as a refusal 
to participate in discriminatory activities, there is a judicial inclination 
to give the employee the benefit of the doubt when determining if the 
employee’s opposition should be protected.  It only seems natural that 
this inclination should exist in a rejection of sexual advances scenario 
as well, and there are many reasons why this should be the case.  It 
may be as simple as the desire to stay true to Title VII’s main purpose 
of protecting employees from discrimination in the workplace, or it 
may be that the rejection of sexual advances seems no different than 
other forms of protected opposition activity, in that the employee’s 
goal is to put a stop to the discriminatory conduct.  Additionally, 
judges may find it burdensome to require employees to reject the 
sexual advance and then later oppose the discriminatory act in a more 
traditional way, considering that s/he may receive an adverse 
employment action before s/he has the chance to protest in that 
traditional manner (i.e., complaining to another supervisor, human 
resources, or an equal employment opportunity officer).  Lastly, judges 
may continue to sympathize with employees regarding the complicated 
dynamics of the workplace, in that employees must maintain a difficult 
balance, weighing the need to keep a job with the need to maintain 
personal sanctity.  Judges may also remember that in sexual 
harassment cases, the courts do not allow an employee’s consent to 
sexual advances to eliminate an otherwise meritorious claim, 
considering that the advances may still have been “unwelcome.”84  In 
light of that sympathetic and realistic approach to sexual harassment 
claims, allowing a retaliation claim to fail when an employee actually 
rejected the advance would seem contradictory.   
 
B. Drawing Distinctions: Rejecting Sexual Advances is a Unique 
Situation That Calls for Flexibility in Assessing Protected Activity. 
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The previous section argued that the federal courts have created a body 
of case law that indicates that the rejection of sexual advances should 
constitute “speaking out” against discrimination.  If a court remains 
unconvinced by drawing comparisons to current case law, then 
perhaps distinguishing rejection of sexual advances from other, more 
traditional forms of opposition activity will be more persuasive.  This 
subsection will first argue that the courts have long understood that the 
facts underlying a retaliation claim under the opposition clause come 
in a wide variety, and that the weights applied to the different 
requirements of protected activity depends on the details of the 
retaliation scenario.  The second part of this section will address the 
unique nature of the rejection of sexual advances, which will 
ultimately set up the argument that such scenarios call for a particular 
legal analysis.   
 
1. The Courts Have Recognized That Flexibility is Required to 
Properly Analyze Opposition Activity Regarding Title VII Retaliation 
Claims. 
 
The facts arising out of a retaliation claim under the opposition 
clause can take a wide variety of forms.  In deciding opposition clause 
cases, the lower courts have made it clear that the language of the 
opposition clause protects a wider range of activities than does Title 
VII’s participation clause.85  Protests, demonstrations, confrontation, 
refusal to participate in discriminatory practices, and self-help 
activities may, in appropriate instances, constitute “opposition” under 
the statute.86  So in a sense, the opposition clause is meant to serve as a 
limited catchall provision for protected activity that is not covered 
under the participation clause.  As discussed in the Background 
Section of this comment, the courts have determined that for 
opposition to be protected, the employee must “speak out” against the 
employer’s discriminatory act and the opposition must be 
accompanied by a reasonable, good-faith belief that the discriminatory 
act was unlawful under Title VII.87  These two requirements can be 
applied to virtually any retaliation fact pattern imaginable, with some 
scenarios being easier to assess than others.  The easiest fact pattern 
for a court to assess is when an employee witnesses a discriminatory 
act that is clearly in violation of Title VII and s/he goes forward to 
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report the act to an upper-level supervisor.  The employee here fulfills 
the requirements of the opposition clause by speaking out against the 
discriminatory act in a reasonable way to a superior, which is among 
the most traditional ways to handle such situations.  And since the act 
was clearly in violation of Title VII, the employee possessed a 
reasonable, good-faith belief that the discriminatory act violated the 
statute. 
 The courts, however, are not always presented with facts where 
it is clear that the employee should receive protection under the 
opposition clause.  And not surprisingly, “in cases where it is not clear 
whether an employee’s words or conduct constitute ‘opposition,’ the 
decisions are not easily reconciled.”88  Ambiguous protests, like our 
own rejection of sexual advances, have forced courts to engage in an 
exercise of flexibility to ensure that an employee’s meritorious claim 
proceeds while still staying faithful to the statutory language of Title 
VII.  So given the countervailing interests involved in determining 
whether an employee’s opposition activity should be protected, courts 
often choose to balance the requirements of protected activity 
depending on the facts with which they are presented.   
 An example of such flexibility in the face of an ambiguous 
protest is illustrated in Casna v. City of Loves Park.89  There, the 
employee had a hearing impairment, and upon apologizing to her 
supervisor for failing to file a report in a timely manner, the supervisor 
responded, “How can you work if you cannot hear?”90  The employee 
responded, “Aren’t you being discriminatory?”91  Although the 
supervisor knew that the employee had a hearing impairment, she also 
had seen the employee listening to music at her desk.92  In ruling that 
the employee’s response was protected activity under the opposition 
clause, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not even consider 
whether the employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the 
supervisor’s question amounted to a statutory violation.93  Therefore, it 
is evident that the “speaking out” component outweighed the 
reasonable, good-faith belief requirement, considering the employee 
used the word “discriminatory” in her opposition act.94  Additionally, 
in Green v. Franklin National Bank of Minneapolis, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that the employee engaged in a protected 
                                                 
 
88
 See LINDEMANN, supra note 18, at 15-17.   
89
 See Casna v. City of Loves Park, 574 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2009). 
90
 Id. at 423. 
91
 Id. 
92
 Id. 
93
 Id. at 427.   
94
 Id. 
2014] Han 55 
 
activity because she complained to higher-level supervisors of alleged 
racial discrimination.95  Like the Seventh Circuit in Casna, the Eighth 
Circuit failed to consider whether the employee had a reasonable, 
good-faith belief that a discriminatory act was conducted in violation 
of Title VII.   
 There is value to the proposition that courts should exercise 
flexibility when assessing retaliation claims.  The workplace is a 
highly political and complicated environment, and opposition activity 
and the corresponding retaliation come in an infinite amount of shapes 
and sizes.  Just like with any issue before the court, however, giving a 
judge too much discretion in determining which opposition activity 
should be protected under Title VII can be dangerous.  To balance this 
judicial flexibility, the court should consider the facts of each case.  
Where the facts demonstrate a clear and egregious act of 
discrimination by the employer, the court should focus on analyzing 
the “speaking out” component of protected activity, as it is obvious 
that the employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that Title VII 
was violated.  Regarding the rejection of sexual advances, however, 
elements of flexibility and strict diligence are required in the protected 
activity analysis to arrive at a fair determination.  The following 
subsection will provide the context for what makes the rejection of 
sexual advances fundamentally different from other traditional forms 
of opposition, thereby setting up the proposed framework that 
incorporates flexibility and diligence in one analysis.   
 
2. Articulating the Judicial Inclination: What Makes the Rejection 
of Sexual Advances Unique? 
 
The rejection of sexual advances presents a unique dynamic 
that deserves flexible treatment when determining whether such 
activity is protected.  Title VII, however, does not permit judges to 
protect conduct from retaliation because certain conduct just feels like 
it should be protected.  As addressed previously, opposition clause 
doctrine demands that employees engage in opposition in a particular 
manner to be deemed protected activity.  We have seen, however, that 
federal courts have neglected to engage in a rigorous analysis when 
determining whether the employee’s opposition is a protected activity.  
The courts instead act on an inclination to find such opposition 
protected.  The rejection of sexual advances is a scenario where such a 
judicial inclination would arise, and although never articulated, the 
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inclination is justified by the fact that the scenario is distinguishable 
from any other discriminatory act covered under Title VII.   
Consider the different situations in which life places us.  We 
are often thrown into scenarios where we must interact with superiors, 
interact with children, study in a library, play a round of golf, and so 
on.  If you are a reasonable and rational person, you realize that each 
of these different situations has its own particular rules, and as a 
reasonable and rational person, you would abide by them.  When 
interacting with a superior, you know to speak in a manner that 
conveys respect, whereas when you speak to a child, you know to 
speak using simple words so that the child understands what you are 
saying.  Just like when studying in a library, you know to speak 
quietly, so you do not disturb others in their studies and on a golf 
course, you know not to speak during someone’s backswing so you do 
not disturb their concentration.    
With these concepts in mind, the unique nature of the rejection 
of sexual advances can be illustrated by using the following analogy.  
First, imagine two people playing a game of hot potato, which is the 
game where participants toss each other a ball to the sound of music 
and the player holding the ball when the music stops is eliminated 
from the game.  As the game begins, the first player tosses the ball to 
the second player, and the second player, of course, tosses the ball 
back.  The first player fully expects to receive the ball back and the 
second player naturally, and quickly, tosses the ball back, as she 
knows the rules of the game.  Stepping away from hot potato, now 
imagine a baseball game, with a pitcher throwing a pitch to a batter, 
and assume that the pitch is one that the batter is able to hit.  The rules 
of baseball instill much different expectations on the pitcher, as the 
batter has many choices on how to approach the pitch.  He may take a 
swing at the ball, go for a bunt, or let the ball pass.  These 
hypotheticals demonstrate that the rules of the game dictate the 
players’ expectations and choices.       
The typical discriminatory act that would violate Title VII 
resembles the baseball hypothetical: an act is done or a comment is 
made at, or in the presence of, an employee, and the employee is left 
with a choice on how to respond.  The game here could be titled “Self-
Preservation,” where the rules dictate that one considers all 
consequences before responding to a situation.  Applying these rules, 
the supervisor, like the pitcher, acts in a unilateral manner and does not 
expect a particular reaction from the employee.  But the employee, like 
the batter, is left with a choice on how to address what s/he has 
witnessed or experienced.  There is not a single natural or normal way 
for a person to oppose the discriminatory act, meaning that observing 
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the act and making the conscious decision to protest is only one of the 
many options available to her.   
An employee’s rejection of sexual advances resembles the 
game of hot potato, in that the situation exists in the form of a “back 
and forth” initiated by the supervisor.  The game here could be titled 
“Human Interaction,” and the rules dictate that if you are asked a 
question, you should respond.  Applying the rules, the supervisor 
makes advances, typically in the form of a question or invitation, and 
the employee responds.  The employee here is provided with a natural 
and sole mechanism to respond to an employer’s discriminatory act, 
and more importantly, the mechanism exists because of the format 
constructed by the supervisor in making the advance.  Although the 
substance of the employee’s response may vary, the rules of “Human 
Interaction” dictate that s/he must respond, as opposed to the rules of 
“Self-Preservation.”  Simply not responding to a sexual advance, or 
any question for that matter, would be a violation of human interaction 
rules, and is not something that a reasonable and rational person would 
do.    
The courts have always been open to considering the 
importance of context, or the rules of the situation, in deciding cases 
under Title VII.  Considering these analogies, it is clear that the 
rejection of sexual advances presents a situation that is unique from 
any other opposition activity scenario.  The supervisor provides a 
framework where the employee must respond to the advances, and 
upon rejecting the advance, the courts should give the employee the 
presumption that s/he has “spoken out.”  The rules dictating more 
traditional opposition scenarios do not require the employee to respond 
at all, as the employee must make an active choice to protest.  
So accordingly, it is fair to expect employees in more traditional 
scenarios to speak out against discriminatory acts in a more concrete 
manner. 
 
C. A Reasonable Solution: When to Exercise Flexibility and When 
to Exercise Diligence 
 
When confronting a rejection of sexual advances scenario in a 
Title VII retaliation case, the courts should prevent an employee’s 
claim to live or die based on whether that employee has properly 
“spoken out” against the discriminatory act.  This comment has 
presented several arguments that assert that the rejection of sexual 
advances is a unique situation where the courts should presume that 
the employee has indeed “spoken out” against discrimination, even 
though the employee did not do so in a traditional manner to which 
courts are accustomed to protecting.  First, the Supreme Court has 
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maintained in Crawford that activity similar to rejection of sexual 
advances should be considered protected activity.  Second, many 
federal appellate courts have held that opposition activity 
fundamentally similar to rejection of sexual advances is protected 
activity.  Third, even if one were to disregard the current case law that 
is applicable to the issue at bar, the rejection of sexual advances is a 
unique scenario because it occurs in a “question and answer” 
framework that is initiated by the supervisor.  There is no other 
opposition scenario that occurs in such a manner, meaning that the 
rejection of sexual advances demands a flexible approach in terms of 
the “speaking out” requirement of protected activity.  Thus, although 
the employee does not exercise the most traditional form of opposition 
when s/he rejects a sexual advance, the courts should be flexible in the 
analysis and presume that the employee has successfully spoken out 
against an allegedly discriminatory act.   
 This presumption of speaking out, however, should come at a 
cost to the employee.  As previously illustrated, the courts have often 
been lax when it comes to assessing whether the employee had a 
reasonable, good-faith belief that the employer’s act violated Title VII.  
The courts have determined through interpreting the opposition clause 
that the employee should at least have a reasonable, good-faith belief 
that the supervisor violated Title VII for their opposition to be 
protected from retaliation.  This second requirement serves the purpose 
of preventing employees from improperly shielding themselves from 
termination by complaining about issues that Title VII does not cover.  
Considering the complicated nature of rejection of sexual advances, 
the situation is one that demands a harder look at the reasonable, good-
faith belief requirement to protect employers from frivolous opposition 
activity.  Surprisingly, however, the lower courts that have addressed 
facts involving rejection of sexual advances have neglected to apply 
the reasonable, good-faith belief requirement in deciding whether the 
rejection should be protected.  
 The discriminatory act arising from a rejection of a sexual 
advance will likely be sexual harassment based on a hostile work 
environment.  The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding sexually 
hostile work environments is relatively clear, in that the Court requires 
that “[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently 
severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] 
employment and create an abusive working environment.”96  The 
Court has maintained that the work environment must be one that ‘a 
reasonable person’ would find hostile, looking at all of the 
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circumstances, and that, additionally, the plaintiff must have 
subjectively perceived the environment as hostile.97  Factors to assess 
within the totality of circumstances include “the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether [the conduct] is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, 
and whether [the conduct] unreasonably interferes with [the 
complainant’s] work performance.”98   
 An employee’s claim for retaliation based on the rejection of 
sexual advances is linked to an underlying claim of a sexually hostile 
work environment.  A federal court analyzing such a retaliation claim 
must evaluate whether the employee had a reasonable, good-faith 
belief that her supervisor has created a hostile work environment that 
actually changed the conditions of the employee’s employment.  The 
fact that a supervisor’s sexual advance was met with an employee’s 
rejection is insufficient to establish that the employee’s act is 
protected, because there is no inquiry into whether the employee had a 
reasonable, good-faith belief that the supervisor created a hostile work 
environment.  Considering that sexual advances are relatively tame 
compared to other scenarios that create a sexually hostile work 
environment, showing that the employee had a reasonable, good-faith 
belief that such a work environment existed should not be an easy 
burden for the employee to bear.  The court must be sure that the 
advances were made in such a manner and frequency that would 
objectively create a hostile work environment and must also confirm 
that the employee found the conduct unwelcoming, as opposed to, say, 
flattering.   
 The recommended analysis provides a reasonable compromise 
in addressing the rejection of sexual advances.  Although the 
employee’s rejection is ambiguous in terms of speaking out against 
Title VII violations, s/he is presumed to have spoken out considering 
the unique nature of such opposition activity.  The employer, however, 
receives protection from frivolous claims by requiring the employee to 
make the difficult showing that s/he had a reasonable, good-faith belief 
that her supervisor created a sexually hostile work environment 
through his advance.  
 
D.  Policy Considerations 
 
Aside from the legal considerations that justify this comment’s 
suggested framework, several policy issues exist that support the 
                                                 
 
97
 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993). 
98
 Id. at 23. 
60     Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice     [Vol. 2:2 
 
 
framework as well.  The reality of the workplace is a controlling force 
for all employees, and courts should take care to apply the law in a 
manner that protects the reasonable party, whether it be the employee 
or employer.   
 
1. Reasons to Presume that an Employee Speaks Out Against a 
Title VII Violation in a Rejection of a Sexual Advance Scenario. 
 
If an employee rejects a sexual advance with a simple “No,” 
and the courts were to rule that such a rejection is not protected for the 
lack of speaking out against a Title VII violation, an untenable 
dynamic would result in the workplace.  An employee would know 
that her rejection is only protected if s/he either engages in traditional 
forms of opposition, such as reporting the incident(s) to human 
resources or other supervisors, or if s/he specifically references illegal 
discrimination in her rejection.  Considering that the discriminatory act 
the employee will be opposing is a sexually hostile work environment, 
the question arises as to when s/he should oppose the conduct in a way 
that would be protected.  If s/he opposes in a protected manner too 
early in a series of advances, s/he runs the risk of being terminated 
with no meritorious retaliation claim because s/he likely had no 
reasonable, good-faith belief that the supervisor’s behavior was severe 
or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment.  Therefore, 
if the employee wants to preserve a potential retaliation claim, the 
employee would be encouraged to wait and withstand the abuse of the 
sexual advances until it becomes objectively clear that a sexually 
hostile work environment has been created.  Requiring the plaintiff to 
oppose retaliation in a more traditional, specific manner puts her in a 
Catch-22, in that s/he risks losing protection under a potential 
retaliation claim, or s/he is forced to withstand the abuse of unwanted 
sexual advances until s/he can satisfy the requirement that a hostile 
work environment was objectively established.   
 
2. Reasons to Require the Employee to Show That S/he Had a 
Reasonable, Good-Faith Belief That a Supervisor Created a Sexually 
Hostile Work Environment.   
 
If courts neglect to consider whether an employee had a 
reasonable, good-faith belief that a supervisor created a sexually 
hostile work environment, then efficiency in the workplace will surely 
be affected.  First, once management becomes aware that an employee 
has rejected the sexual advance of a supervisor, there will be a 
presumptive shield around the employee, because the conduct has 
already been deemed protected by the law.  This can handcuff 
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management from applying an adverse employment action against an 
employee who may legitimately deserve to be disciplined.  
Additionally, from a retaliation claim standpoint, management will 
have no incentive to keep supervisors in check once it becomes known 
that an employee has rejected a sexual advance.  If courts do not 
consider an employee’s reasonable, good-faith belief that a sexually, 
hostile work environment was created, then there is nothing else in the 
retaliation analysis that rewards management for trying to put a stop to 
the harassing behavior.  If courts would consistently consider the 
employee’s reasonable, good-faith belief, then management would 
have the incentive to interfere before the employee could objectively 
establish the belief that a hostile, work environment has been created.   
 
3. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar 
 
In June of 2013, the United States Supreme Court determined 
the critical issue of causation in the plaintiff’s prima facie case for 
retaliation in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. 
Nassar.  The case came from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and 
involved Dr. Nassar, who was a member of the University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center (“UTSW”) medical faculty.99  Nassar 
claimed that UTSW retaliated against him when the medical center 
blocked his transfer to an affiliated hospital in response to his 
complaint that a supervisor engaged in racial harassment.100  The issue 
before the Court was whether the but-for standard, or the mixed-
motive standard of causation applies when an employee shows that 
his/her protected activity was connected to the employer’s adverse 
employment action.101  The Court held that the but-for standard of 
causation applies to the plaintiff’s prima facie case in retaliation 
claims.102  The Court supported this conclusion through the lack of any 
difference between the statutory language in Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provisions and the relevant provisions of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, where in the latter, the Court has previously 
determined that the but-for standard of causation applies.103   
 The Nassar decision further demonstrates that this comment’s 
suggested framework would provide a reasonable balance between 
employee and employer in rejection of sexual advances scenarios.  The 
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Court has altered the balance of the plaintiff’s prima facie case by 
placing a weight in favor of the employer by establishing a but-for 
standard of causation, as opposed to the employee-friendly mixed-
motive analysis used in Title VII discrimination claims.  In a rejection 
of sexual advances scenario, if the courts required employees to 
oppose the sexual harassment in a traditional manner beyond the 
rejection itself, and further required the employee to show that the 
opposition activity was the but-for cause of the adverse employment 
action, a fundamental rule of the prima facie case would be lost.  It is 
well established that the prima facie case, as a whole, is not intended 
to be a high hurdle for the plaintiff to clear.  Favoring the employer 
throughout the plaintiff’s prima facie case is particularly burdensome 
considering the fact that the plaintiff must also maintain the burden of 
proof throughout the entire McDonnell-Douglas analysis (with the 
employer only bearing the burden of production in establishing a 
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action).  
Additionally, more traditional forms of opposition, like complaining to 
human resources, is a more revealing process than a mere rejection of 
a sexual advance.  Traditional forms of opposition signal to 
management that the employee is serious about putting an end to the 
harassment, which as a result, could lead management to be more 
careful in terminating a “trouble-maker” employee by thoroughly 
searching for any performance deficiencies.  Considering the but-for 
standard of causation the employee bears, it will be much harder for 
that employee to meet the standard when the employer is given such a 
clear warning signal to cover its bases before a termination.  A mere 
rejection of a sexual advance will not put such a burden on the 
employee when s/he has to prove but for causation, because 
management would be unsure of the employee’s degree of resolve to 
put an end to the potential harassment.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 The workplace is a complicated environment, where 
professional aspirations will often intersect with personal desires.  
When these two interests conflict, particularly in the context of one 
party having power over another, adverse consequences like 
victimization and decreased efficiency will likely result.  Legislators 
and the courts do what they can to protect employees in such 
situations, but statutory language and judicial frameworks can only 
address so many workplace issues.  When a unique situation slips 
through the cracks, the courts should keep in mind the many 
countervailing interests of the workplace in making their 
determinations, rather than forcing circles in places that have only 
been occupied by squares.   
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 It has been clear that for an employee to be protected from 
retaliation for opposing unlawful acts under Title VII, the employee 
must oppose in a way that is statutorily protected.  In the factual 
scenario involving an employee’s rejection of a supervisor’s sexual 
advances, the lower federal courts disagree as to whether such acts are 
statutorily protected against retaliation.  Some courts subscribe to the 
belief that such rejections are not protected against retaliation because 
employees have to oppose unlawful acts in a more traditional, explicit 
manner to gain statutory protection.  Other courts argue that a rejection 
alone suffices as a statutorily protected activity, because such 
rejections are inherently opposition activity against unlawful acts.  
This comment has attempted to demonstrate that the present issue is 
too complicated to determine protected activity through an “eyeball 
test,” and that the rejection of sexual advances raises a wide range of 
considerations and implications that demand a careful analysis.  These 
considerations and implications reveal that when an employee rejects 
her supervisor’s sexual advance(s), s/he should be granted the 
presumption that s/he properly “spoke out” against the act.  The 
presumption, however, should be harnessed by a consistent and 
diligent judicial analysis as to whether the employee had a reasonable, 
good-faith belief that the supervisor violated Title VII, by referring to 
the “severe and pervasive” standard of sexual harassment.  This 
approach provides a reasonable balance in that it protects the employee 
who has rejected sexual advances in the highly political workplace, but 
also protects the employer in that the sexual advances need to rise to a 
certain level of severity and pervasiveness so that the employee 
reasonably believed that she was being subjected to a sexually hostile 
work environment.   
   
